原創翻譯:龍騰網 //www.oewjxg.com.cn 翻譯:君子沖盈 轉載請注明出處



While it has become nearly axiomatic for observers of world affairs to contend that the U.S.-led postwar order is under growing, if not unprecedented, duress, there is little consensus about what architecture, if any, might replace it. A recent assessment ventures that the successor to the global system of governance we have known since the Second World War [may be] not another order but the absence of one. It is possible that the world, squeezed between the incompatible visions of a retreating U.S. and a resurgent China, is already hurtling toward chaos.

雖然對于世界事務觀察家來說,美國領導的戰后秩序即使不是史無前例的,也是日益增長的,這已經成為幾乎不言而喻的事實,但對于什么樣的架構( 如果有的話) 可能取代它,人們幾乎沒有達成共識。
最近的一項評估認為,我們自第二次世界大戰以來所熟知的全球治理體系的繼承者可能不是另一種秩序,而是沒有秩序。
很有可能,夾在美國撤退和中國復興這兩個不可兼容的愿景之間的世界,已經在朝著混亂的方向疾馳。



There is also growing concern about the mobilization of disintegrationist elements within Europe. In a speech in April last year, French president Emmanuel Macron warned that “a sort of European civil war is reappearing,” observing that “our differences, sometimes our national egoisms, appear more important than what unites us in relation to the rest of the world.” Even more ominously, he concluded that a “fascination with illiberalism…is growing by the day.” Examples of that fascination abound. Italy’s interior minister has called for a census of the country’s Roma population. Austria’s chancellor has urged his country to form an “axis of the willing against illegal migration” with Germany and Italy. In a multifaceted effort to limit George Soros’ influence, Hungary has forced the closure of Central European University, a prestigious Budapest-based institution funded by the philanthropist; pressured the Open Society Foundation until Soros declared that its Budapest operations were no longer safe; and passed a “Stop Soros” law that effectively criminalizes efforts to provide humanitarian aid and legal assistance to undocumented immigrants. The country’s prime minister has declared that: “Rather than try to fix a liberal democracy that has run aground, we will build a 21st-century Christian democracy.”

人們還日益關切歐洲內部動員分裂分子的情況。
在去年4月的一次演講中,法國總統埃馬紐埃爾 · 馬克龍警告稱,“歐洲內戰正在重演”。
他指出,“我們的分歧,有時我們的民族利己主義,似乎比我們與世界其他國家的聯系更為重要?!?更不祥的是,他的結論是“對非自由主義的迷戀... ... 與日俱增?!?這種迷戀的例子比比皆是。
意大利內政部長呼吁對該國的羅姆人(譯注:就是吉普賽人)進行普查。
奧地利總理敦促他的國家與德國和意大利一起形成“反對非法移民的意愿軸心”。
為了限制喬治 · 索羅斯的影響力,匈牙利嘗試了多方面的努力,迫使中歐大學關閉,這是一所總部設在布達佩斯的著名機構,由慈善家提供資金,匈牙利向開放社會基金會施壓,直到索羅斯宣布布達佩斯的業務不再安全,并通過了一項”禁止索羅斯”的法律,該法律實際上將向非法移民提供人道主義援助和法律援助的行為定為刑事犯罪,該國總理宣稱: “與其試圖修復擱淺的自由民主,我們不如建立一個21世紀的基督教民主?!?br />
Some perspective is in order. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a sufficiently confident and widespread authoritarian ascent that, according to political theorist John Keane, only eleven electoral democracies remained by 1941. Franklin Roosevelt warned in a speech in March of that year that the United States would have to furnish “fuel in ever-increasing amounts” to safeguard “the great flame of democracy from the blackout of barbarism.” Today there are 116 electoral democracies—down from 120 two decades ago, concerningly, but still an impressive number.

有一些觀點是恰當的, 二十世紀上半葉我們見證了一個充滿自信和廣泛傳播的威權主義國家崛起,根據政治理論家 John Keane 的說法,到1941年只剩下十一個選舉民主國家。
富蘭克林·德拉諾·羅斯福在當年3月的一次演講中警告說,美國將不得不提供“越來越多的燃料” ,以?;ぁ懊裰韉奈按蠡鷓婷庠庖奧貝南稹?,令人擔憂的是,如今只有116個選舉民主國家,比20年前的120個有所下降,當然,這仍然是一個令人印象深刻的數字。



It would be premature to suggest, however, that globalization is reversing. The World Bank reports that “net capital inflows [into developing countries] entered positive territory in 2017, following two years of large contractions”—a development that “has been facilitated by the improving economic outlook in several large emerging economies.” There are hopeful signs on trade flows as well. Consider an oft-cited gauge of globalization, the ratio between the growth rate of world merchandise trade and that of real gross world product. Historically hovering at 1.5, it fell to an average of 1.0 between 2011 and 2016; in 2017, however, it rebounded to 1.5. The World Trade Organization (WTO) forecast last April that trade would grow at 4.4 percent in 2018 and 4 percent this year, compared to the post-crisis average of three percent.

然而,認為全球化正在逆轉還為時過早。
世界銀行報告稱,“(流入發展中國家的) 凈資本在連續兩年大幅收縮之后,于2017年進入正值水平”——這一發展趨勢“得益于幾個大型新興經濟體經濟前景的改善” ,在貿易流動方面也出現了令人鼓舞的跡象。
考慮一個經常被引用的全球化指標,即世界商品貿易增長率與實際生產總值增長率之間的比率,歷史上一直徘徊在1.5的水平,2011年到2016年間下降到了平均1.0的水平,然而在2017年,回升到了1.5。
世界貿易組織去年4月預測,2018年和今年的貿易額將分別增長4.4% 和4% ,而?;蟮鈉驕齔ぢ飾?% 。

Continued progress on bilateral and regional trade deals suggests that this pace may endure. Eleven of the twelve countries that were negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership have finalized the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, covering some 13.5 percent of gross world product (GWP). Japan and the European unx (eu) have signed a bilateral trade agreement, the world’s largest, that accounts for roughly 30 percent of GWP. Negotiations are also inching forward on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a sixteen-country arrangement that, too, would incorporate some 30 percent of GWP.

雙邊和地區貿易協定的持續進展表明,這種速度可能會持續下去。
正在談判《跨太平洋伙伴關系協定》的12個國家最終達成了《跨太平洋伙伴關系全面進步協定》,涵蓋了全球生產總值 (GWP) 的13.5%。
日本和歐盟簽署了一項雙邊貿易協定,這是世界上最大的貿易協定,約占全球生產總值的30% 。
關于區域全面經濟伙伴關系的談判也在緩慢向前推進,這是一個由16個國家組成的協議,也將納入約30% 的全球生產總值。

The third reason some observers see parallels with the 1930s—and also, incidentally, with the Cold War—is the return of great power competition, with Russia and China occupying center stage. But neither country is posing a frontal assault on the postwar order; the former is opportunistically obstructive, while the latter is sextively revisionist. Moscow is continuously challenged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its west and increasingly dependent on China to its east. Beijing’s ambitions, meanwhile, are constrained not only by an increasingly apprehensive Washington but also by strong powers in Canberra, Delhi, Seoul and Tokyo that seek to forestall the resumption of a Sinocentric hierarchy in the Asia-Pacific. While the current order is undoubtedly under strain, there is at least an order to defend. Today, moreover, despite the present vagaries in its foreign policy, the United States is the world’s lone superpower; in the 1930s, by contrast, despite commanding the world’s largest economy, Washington’s military and diplomatic influence beyond its borders lagged far behind its industrial heft.

第三個原因是大國競爭的回歸,俄羅斯和中國占據了中心舞臺。
但這兩個國家都沒有正面攻擊戰后秩序,前者是機會主義式的阻礙,而后者是選擇性的修正主義者。
莫斯科西面不斷受到北大西洋公約組織的挑戰,東面越來越依賴中國。
與此同時,中國的雄心受到限制,不僅是因為華盛頓方面越來越不安,還因為堪培拉、德里、首爾和東京試圖阻止亞太地區恢復以中國為中心的統治,
盡管目前的秩序無疑處于緊張狀態,但至少還有一個可防御的秩序。
此外,今天,盡管美國的外交政策變幻莫測,但美國是世界上唯一的超級大國,相比之下,在20世紀30年代,盡管美國是世界上最大的經濟體,但華盛頓的軍事和外交影響力遠遠落后于其工業影響力。

Perhaps even more common is the suggestion that the United States is entering into a new Cold War. There is little agreement on the antagonist in this alleged confrontation: some say that it is Russia; others, China; yet others, a Sino-Russian authoritarian axis; and even some, the menace of terrorism, in its ever-changing structure and roster of outfits. That this number of actors can be characterized as America’s putative opponent in a new Cold War suggests an intrinsic limitation to the analogy.

也許更常見的說法是美國正在進入一場新的冷戰。
在這場所謂的對抗中,人們對對手的看法幾乎沒有達成一致:
有人說是俄羅斯,有人說是中國,還有人說是中俄威權軸心, 甚至還有人說是恐怖主義的威脅,其結構和組織名單不斷在變化。
在新冷戰中,這么多角色可以被描述為美國的假定對手,這表明這種類比有其內在的局限性。

To speak of a new Cold War is to suggest not only that the United States once more confronts a rival power with ambitions of global dominance and pretensions to a universal ideology, but also that that power can and will employ territorial aggression, proxy warfare and client states across the world in the service of its strategic obxtives. Neither of the two supposed antagonists in this sequel, though, would seem to fit this descxtion.

談到新的冷戰,不僅表明美國再次面對一個擁有全球統治野心和普遍意識形態自命不凡的敵對大國,而且表明這個大國能夠并且將會使用領土侵略、代理人戰爭和世界各地的附庸國為其戰略目標服務,然而,這部續集中的兩個所謂的對手似乎都不符合這種描述。

Russia is undoubtedly a major power, commanding the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, the world’s largest proven reserves of natural gas and a veto on the United Nations Security Council. But it is a pale shadow of the Soviet unx, which, upon dissolving, yielded Russia and fourteen post-Soviet republics, three of which—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—now belong to NATO. Russia’s population is slated to decline from roughly 144 million today to 133 million by 2050, a nearly 8 percent drop. Its energy leverage in Europe, while significant, is far less than it was at the end of the Cold War; where Moscow accounted for three-quarters of the EU’s gas imports in 1990, it now accounts for under two-fifths.

俄羅斯無疑是一個大國,擁有世界上最大的核武庫、世界上已探明的最大天然氣儲量,并在聯合國安理會擁有否決權,但它只是蘇聯的一個蒼白的影子,蘇聯解體后,產生了俄羅斯和十四個后蘇聯加盟共和國,其中拉脫維亞、立陶宛和愛沙尼亞現在屬于北約。
預計到2050年,俄羅斯人口將從現在的大約1.44億下降到1.33億,降幅接近8% 。
俄羅斯在歐洲的能源影響力雖然很大,但遠低于冷戰結束時的水平——1990年,俄羅斯占歐盟天然氣進口量的四分之三,如今占不到五分之二。



China’s economic progress is arguably of even greater concern to the United States. Beijing is on track to displace Washington in absolute economic size well before the middle of this century. It appears intent on constructing and anchoring an expansive Eurasian economic order, especially as seen with its work on the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative. Having been included in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of special drawing rights, the renminbi is embarking on a slow but concerted push to become a global reserve currency. Finally, Beijing is taking significant steps to boost its indigenous economic capacity; its spending on research and development increased over thirty-fold between 1995 and 2013, and the government recently announced a strategy that aims to have China become the world’s foremost leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. There is also an appreciable risk that growing trade tensions between Washington and Beijing could yield security ones; the United States increasingly regards China’s technological ambitions as a threat to its national security, while China believes that its existing degree of economic dependence on the U.S. economy gives the United States an unacceptable measure of leverage over its economy. Given that trade interdependence has been one of the few restraints to date on their competition, an erosion of that connective tissue could thrust their relationship into a far more uncertain, potentially escalatory, phase.

中國的經濟發展可以說是美國更加關心的問題,在本世紀中葉之前,北京就有望在絕對經濟規模上取代華盛頓。
中國似乎有意構建和鞏固擴張的歐亞經濟秩序,尤其是其在一帶一路貨幣基金組織倡議方面的工作。
作為國際貨幣基金組織特別提款權一攬子計劃一員,人民幣正開始緩慢但協調一致地努力成為全球儲備貨幣。
最后,北京正在采取重大措施提高本土經濟能力;
從1995年到2013年,中國在研發方面的支出增加了30倍以上,政府最近宣布了一項戰略,旨在使中國在2030年之前成為世界上人工智能領域最重要的領導者。
美國越來越認為中國的科技野心是對其國家安全的威脅,而中國認為其經濟對美國經濟的依賴程度使得美國對其經濟的影響力達到了令人無法接受的程度。
鑒于貿易相互依賴是迄今為止對它們競爭的為數不多的限制之一,對這種結締組織的侵蝕可能會將它們的關系推入一個更加不確定、可能升級的階段。

Finally, an erstwhile muted ideological component of U.S.-China relations is acquiring more salience. The Chinese Communist Party’s move to end presidential term limits means that President Xi could well rule over China for as long as he lives. His policies to date suggest that Beijing’s increasing integration into the global economy, far from inducing it to temper its domestic illiberalism, has made it more confident in its authoritarianism. At the first session of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, he called Chinese governance “a great contribution to political civilization of humanity” and argued that democratic governance, “confined by interests of different political parties, classes, regions, and groups, tears society apart.” In “Document 9,” moreover, issued in April 2013, senior Party leaders warned that China had to counter “Western forces hostile to China,” including the promulgation of “constitutional democracy” and “universal values” of human rights. China is also becoming more aggressive in its crackdown on political dissidents and ethnic minorities.
In the aggregate, then, while most U.S. observers continue to emphasize both the competitive and cooperative elements of U.S.-China relations, they increasingly fear that the former are overtaking the latter.

最后,美中關系中一個從前默默無聞的意識形態因素正變得更加突出。
到目前為止,他的政策表明,北京日益融入全球經濟,非但沒有促使其緩和國內的不自由主義,反而使其對威權主義更加自信。
在中國人民政治協商會議第十三屆全國委員會第一次會議上,他稱中國的治理是“對人類政治文明的偉大貢獻” ,并認為民主治理“受不同政黨、階級、地區、團體利益的限制,會撕裂社會”
此外,在2013年4月發布的《9號文件》中,黨的高級領導人警告說,中國必須打擊“西方敵視中國的勢力” ,包括頒布“憲政民主”和人權的“普世價值觀”。
中國在鎮壓持不同政見者和少數民族方面也變得更加積極。
因此,總體而言,盡管大多數美國觀察家繼續強調美中關系中的競爭與合作因素,但他們越來越擔心前者正在取代后者。

Still, it is a leap too far to conclude that the United States is in a new Cold War with China. America’s confrontation with the Soviet unx spanned the entire world; today, however, Washington is the lone superpower, while Beijing remains a regional power, albeit one with an increasingly global footprint. Middle powers have far more room to benefit from U.S.-China rivalry than they did from U.S.-Soviet rivalry: they can increase their diplomatic and security ties with the United States while boosting their trade and investment relations with China. Beijing is not undertaking to export revolutionary ideology in the way that Moscow did. The United States and China have also achieved an extraordinary level of economic interdependence over the past four decades, and especially since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. In addition, notes the Brookings Institution’s Cheng Li, even as the two countries become increasingly suspicious of one another’s strategic intentions, contact between the two nations has never been broader, deeper, and more frequent than it is today—whether it be at the head of state, military, think tank, sub-national, commercial, educational, cultural, or tourism level.

盡管如此,得出美國與中國正處于一場新的冷戰的結論仍然是一個太大的飛躍。
美國與蘇聯的對抗橫跨了整個世界,然而,今天,華盛頓是唯一的超級大國,而中國仍然是一個區域強國,盡管它的足跡越來越全球化。
中等國家從美中對抗中獲益的空間比從美蘇對抗中獲益的空間要大得多:
它們可以增進與美國的外交和安全關系,同時促進與中國的貿易和投資關系。
中國政府不會像莫斯科那樣輸出革命意識形態。
在過去的四十年中,尤其是自2001年中國加入世貿組織以來,美國和中國在經濟上也達到了非同尋常的相互依賴程度。
此外,布魯金斯學會的李成指出,盡管這兩個國家越來越懷疑對方的戰略意圖,但兩國之間的接觸從未像今天這樣廣泛、深入和頻繁ーー無論是在國家元首、軍事、智囊團、地方、商業、教育、文化還是旅游方面。

Because the core of U.S.-China rivalry is economic and technological, not militaristic and ideological, there is greater room for pragmatic cooperation.
China recognizes that the Soviet unx erred by launching a frontal military and ideological assault on the prevailing order; it is more likely to develop its global footprint by building infrastructure than by deploying its armed forces or attempting to inculcate its ideology in distant countries. While it is pressing for greater reforms within the current system and developing a parallel architecture on the outside, it is not agitating for the system’s collapse. There is also little evidence thus far that China seeks to be a superpower in the U.S. mold.

由于中美之間的核心競爭是經濟和技術競爭,而不是軍國主義和意識形態競爭,因此務實合作的空間更大。
中國認識到蘇聯對現有秩序發動正面的軍事和意識形態攻擊是錯誤的,它更有可能通過建設基礎設施來發展其全球影響力,而不是通過部署其武裝力量或試圖在遙遠的國家灌輸其意識形態。
雖然它迫切要求在現有體系內進行更大的改革,并在外部建立一個平行的架構,但它并沒有煽動該體系的崩潰,到目前為止,幾乎沒有證據表明中國尋求成為美國模式下的超級大國。

While skeptical observers might not be as sanguine, China has real, increasingly manifest vulnerabilities at home and abroad. Protracted trade tensions with the United States have exposed frailties in Beijing’s economy, beginning with its gross debt, which grew from 171 percent of gross domestic product in the first quarter of 2008 to 299 percent in the first quarter of 2018. A confluence of phenomena—the aforementioned trade tensions, the recent collapse of a wave of peer-to-peer lending schemes, a grim demographic outlook and a scandal over tainted vaccines, among them—has dented the halo of invincibility around Xi’s rule.

雖然持懷疑態度的觀察人士可能不會這么樂觀,但中國在國內外確實存在著越來越明顯的弱點。
與美國長期的貿易緊張關系暴露了北京經濟的脆弱性,首先是其總債務,從2008年第一季度占國內生產總值的171% 增長到2018年第一季度的299% 。
一系列的現象---- 前面提到的貿易緊張局勢,最近一波網絡借貸公司的崩潰,嚴峻的人口前景和污染疫苗的丑聞---- 已經削弱了圍繞X統治的不可戰勝的光環。

Abroad, the BRI is encountering growing pushback, with a striking recent example coming from Malaysia. Announcing that he was canceling two Chinese-funded projects worth some $22 billion, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared: “We do not want a situation where there is a new version of colonialism happening because poor countries are unable to compete with rich countries.” While Taiwan continues to lose formal recognition, China has been unable to subdue its ambitions for independence; nor, as noted by Michal Thim of the Prague-based Association for International Affairs, has it been able to disrupt Taipei’s “extensive global engagement, including significant relationships with the United States, Europe and Japan.” Finally, its authoritarianism is coming under harsher scrutiny, with numerous reports detailing the intrusiveness of its surveillance apparatus and its widespread detainment of Uighurs.

在國外,一帶一路遇到了越來越大的阻力,最近一個引人注目的例子來自馬來西亞。
在宣布取消兩個價值220億美元的中國資助項目時,馬哈蒂爾·穆罕默德宣布:
我們不希望出現新的殖民主義,因為貧窮國家無法與富裕國家競爭 。
盡管臺灣在繼續失去其它國家對它的正式承認,但中國一直未能遏制其獨立野心,正如總部位于布拉格的國際事務協會的米哈爾 · 泰姆所指出的,中國也未能破壞臺北“廣泛的全球接觸,包括與美國、歐洲和日本的重要關系” 。

If it is wrong to portray Russia as an aggrieved Eurasian player whose influence is sextive and constrained, it is at least as unhelpful to characterize it as a resurgent global power whose influence is wide-ranging and ubiquitous. And if it is misguided to depict China as a fatally hubristic upstart, it cannot be constructive to imagine it an inexorably ascendant colossus. U.S. foreign policy would be better served by adopting more nuanced assessments of the Russian and Chinese challenges than by oscillating between these exaggerations: neither reflexive complacency nor indefinite consternation will enable U.S. competitiveness over the long term.

如果把俄羅斯描繪成一個影響力有選擇性和受限的受到侵害的歐亞國家是錯誤的,那么把俄羅斯描繪成一個影響力廣泛而無處不在的復蘇的全球大國至少也是無益的。
如果把中國描繪成一個傲慢得要命的暴發戶是一種誤導,那么把中國描繪成一個勢不可擋的龐然大物同樣不具有建設性。
美國的外交政策最好是對俄羅斯和中國面臨的挑戰進行更細致入微的評估,而不是在這些夸大之詞之間搖擺:
無論是反射性的自滿還是不確定的驚愕,都不會使美國長期具有競爭力。



In contending with Russia, America’s challenge is three-fold: to preserve a baseline of cooperation where vital U.S. national interests are at stake, to mitigate the irredentist tendencies of a country that waxes nostalgic for its imperial predecessors and to restore a sense of national cohesion that can resist external subversion. Whether the United States meets the China challenge over the long term, meanwhile, will depend on a number of factors: the durability of its economic growth; its ability to remain at the forefront of scientific and technological innovation; its creativity in conducting geo-economic diplomacy, especially in the Asia-Pacific; and its success in persuading long-standing allies that their national interests would be better served by helping to revitalize the postwar order than by conceding its erosion. China is a more nuanced, incremental competitor than the Soviet unx—and, for that reason, a more challenging one.

在與俄羅斯的競爭中,美國面臨的挑戰有三個方面:
在關系到美國重大國家利益的情況下,保持合作的基線,緩和一個懷念其帝國主義前輩的國家的領土收復主義傾向,恢復一種能夠抵御外部顛覆的民族凝聚力。
與此同時,美國能否長期應對中國的挑戰,將取決于幾個因素:
美國經濟增長的持久性,美國保持在科技創新前沿的能力,美國在開展地緣經濟外交,尤其是在亞太地區開展地緣經濟外交方面的創造力,以及美國能否成功說服長期盟友,讓他們相信幫助振興戰后秩序,而不是承認秩序受到侵蝕,會更有利于他們的國家利益。
與蘇聯相比,中國是一個更加微妙、更加激進的競爭對手,因此也更具挑戰性。

The absence of a decided foe has contributed to the lack of strategic discipline in U.S. foreign policy over the past quarter-century, and especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Some in Washington increasingly appears to have accepted the prospect of interminable war in the Middle East, a resignation that, if not revisited, could impose a permanent constraint on its ability to compete with China in the Asia-Pacific. The United States has now been in Afghanistan for more than seventeen years, and though it has made little to no net progress in reducing the Taliban’s share of territory in that country, there is growing controversy on whether it intends to extricate itself. The war in Iraq, meanwhile, is well over fifteen years old, and the United States still has some 5,200 troops there—plus another 2,000 or so in Syria—to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State.

在過去的四分之一世紀里,尤其是2001年9月11日之后,美國外交政策缺乏戰略性的原因之一就是沒有一個堅定的敵人。
華盛頓的一些人似乎越來越接受中東地區可能爆發無休止戰爭的前景。
如果不重新考慮這一問題,可能會對與中國在亞太地區競爭的能力構成永久性限制。
美國在阿富汗已經超過17年了,雖然在減少塔利班在阿富汗的領土份額方面幾乎沒有取得任何進展,但是關于美國是否打算脫離阿富汗的爭議越來越大。
與此同時,伊拉克戰爭已經持續了15年多,為了防止伊斯蘭國重新崛起,美國仍然在那里駐扎了大約5200名士兵,另外還在敘利亞駐扎了大約2000名士兵。

If the world is neither revisiting the interwar period nor embarking on a sequel to the Cold War, where exactly is it heading? There is no shortage of answers: a new era of U.S. preeminence, Chinese preeminence, a U.S.-China “G2,” multipolarity, regional spheres of influence, nonpolarity and a vacuum in order are just a few that observers have offered. Perhaps the most accurate answer is also the most banal: it is hard to say. While the postwar order is eroding, there is no readily apparent replacement in the offing. The National Intelligence Council posits that “[t]he net effect of rising tensions within and between countries—and the growing threat from terrorism—will be greater global disorder and considerable questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system.”

如果世界既不回顧兩次世界大戰之間的時期,也不著手進行冷戰的續集,那么它究竟將走向何方?
這里不乏答案:
美國卓越的新時代、中國卓越的地位、美中“兩國集團”(G2)、多極化、地區勢力范圍、非極性和有序的真空,這些只是觀察人士提供的少數幾個答案。
也許最準確的答案也是最平庸的:
很難說。
盡管戰后秩序正在受到侵蝕,但近期并沒有明顯的替代品。
美國國家情報委員會斷定,“國家內部和國家之間的緊張局勢不斷升級,以及恐怖主義威脅不斷增加,其凈效應將是更嚴重的全球混亂,以及有關國際體系中的規則、制度和權力分配等相當多的問題?!?br />
Perhaps the biggest question involves the role of the United States. In the 1930s it was an emerging power in a world without a clearly defined order. During the Cold War it was one pole of a generally bipolar order. There was a fleeting, roughly seventeen-year period between the end of the Cold War and the onset of the global financial crisis in which, possessing a level of preeminence that it is unlikely to ever reclaim, it proactively sought to diffuse the norms and bolster the institutions it established at the outset of the postwar era. Between the downturn and the inauguration of President Donald Trump, an even shorter interval, it tried to adapt the order in view of the grievances, capabilities and ambitions of core emerging powers. Today, however, under the Trump administration, the United States is both a central pillar of today’s order and one of its principal challengers—a duality whose oddity is difficult to overstate.

也許最大的問題涉及到美國的角色。
上世紀30年代,它是一個沒有明確定義秩序的世界中的新興力量,在冷戰期間,它是兩極秩序中的一極,從冷戰結束到全球金融?;⒅?,有一段短暫的、大約17年的時間。
在這段時間里,中國擁有一定程度的卓越地位,而這種卓越地位永遠不可能被重新樹立起來,中國積極主動地尋求打破常規,并加強其在戰后時代初期建立的機構。
從經濟低迷到唐納德 · 特朗普就職,間隔時間更短,中國試圖根據核心新興大國的不滿、能力和野心來調整秩序。
然而,今天,在特朗普政府的領導下,美國既是當今秩序的核心支柱,也是它的主要挑戰者之一 ——這是一種很難夸大其詞的雙重性。



A degree of such ambiguity invariably inheres in any administration’s foreign policy: top officials neither publicize all of their internal debates nor telegraph every instance in which there may be gaps between America’s declared and actual policies on a given issue. Countries expend enormous effort—parsing official government documents, conducting private diplomacy, producing intelligence assessments and so forth—trying to discern others’ intentions. But execution matters more than intent: while Trump has rightly interrogated the nature and scope of America’s involvement in the postwar order, such is the momentum that often accompanies fundamental recalibrations that it risks producing overreaction. The continuation of an “America First” policy will compel long-standing allies to be more proactive in fashioning arrangements and institutions that circumvent America’s reach; consider, for example, the German foreign minister’s call for a new payments system independent of Washington, the aforementioned Japan-EU free trade deal, the establishment of an EU-China-working group that will consider how to upxe the WTO and growing coordination between the EUand China to write the rules that will govern global internet policy. A United States that is increasingly alone will be increasingly incapable of advancing its national interests.

這種程度的模棱兩可總是存在于任何一屆政府的外交政策中:
高級官員既不會公布他們的內部辯論,也不會對美國在某一特定問題上所宣布的政策與實際政策之間可能存在的差距進行通報。
各國付出了巨大的努力ーー分析官方政府文件、開展私人外交、進行情報評估等等ーー試圖弄清其他國家的意圖。
但是,執行比意圖更重要:
盡管特朗普正確地審視了美國參與戰后秩序的性質和范圍,但這種動力往往伴隨著根本性的重新調整,有可能導致過度反應。
繼續奉行“美國優先”的政策,將迫使長期盟友更加積極主動地制定規避美國影響力的安排和制度;
例如,德國外交部長呼吁建立一個獨立于華盛頓的新支付系統、上述的日歐自由貿易協定、建立一個歐盟-中國工作組以考慮如何更新世貿組織,以及歐盟和中國之間加強協調,制定管理全球互聯網政策的規則。
一個越來越孤立的美國將越來越無力推進其國家利益。