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Japan Is Reinventing Itself As China Surges And American Power Declines

隨著中國的崛起和美國實力的下降,日本正在改變自己



Japan is one of the oldest nations on earth, in cultural terms. And it is also the oldest nation demographically on the planet, with a median age of 47.7 years. Unsurprisingly, Japan has developed a reputation recently for economic and cultural stagnation, a place where nothing of consequence is happening. But it’s wrong to ignore what’s going on in a country that is at the very edge of the liberal world, in a time where the world order led by the United States is waning. Japan has tough choices to make, and slowly, it is making them.

就文化而言,日本是地球上最古老的國家之一。從人口上看,日本也是世界上最老的國家,平均年齡為47.7歲。日本最近因經濟和文化停滯不前而聲名響亮,在這個地方,什么都沒有發生。但是,在一個以美國為首的世界秩序正在衰落的時代,忽視一個處在自由世界邊緣的國家正在發生的事情是錯誤的。日本要做出艱難的選擇,而且正在慢慢地做出這些選擇。

On May 1st, the Japanese Emperor Akihito will abdicate and cede the Chrysanthemum crown to his first son, Naruhito, the crown prince. What I just did, namely referring to the royal family by their birth names, would be a scandal in Japan, though not illegal, as it would be in, say, Thailand. In Japan, the proper way to refer to the royal family would be to say that His Majesty Emperor 天皇陛下 (tennō hēka) will soon abdicate and cede his place to His Highness the Crown Prince 皇太子殿下 (kōtaishi denka).

5月1日,日本明仁天皇退位,將菊花王冠讓給他的長子皇太子德仁。我剛才所做的,也就是用皇室成員的出生名來稱呼他們,在日本會是誹謗,盡管不像在泰國那樣是非法的。在日本,提及皇室的正確方式是說“天皇陛下”很快就會退位,讓“皇太子殿下”接位。

This fact itself is, in theory, of little significance. The Emperor in Japan today is not a controversial figure. Not that people think of him as a god. In fact, the Emperor is barely thought of at all. He is just an old man who does his rituals and gives a rather boring speech now and then. Everybody knows he has no personality of his own, nor is he supposed to; all his behavior and speech are tightly controlled by the Imperial Household Agency. But everybody more or less still has positive feelings toward him.

從理論上講,這一事實本身意義不大。如今,天皇在日本已不是一個話題人物。人們也不再認為他是神。事實上,人們很少有人想到天皇。他只是一個老頭兒,進行他的儀式,時不時地發表一篇無聊的演講。每個人都知道他沒有自己的個性,也不應該有; 他的一切言行都受到宮內廳的嚴格控制。但每個人或多或少還是對他有正面的感情。



This speech came as a huge blow for Japan’s right wing, and especially for the current government. Shinzo Abe, the current prime minister and most powerful politician in Japan for the last half a century, is known to be a strong supporter of a constitutional change to do away with the most liberal parts of the 1948 Constitution, widely considered to be an “American imposition.” A draft (here’s a summary in English) has been circulating for years calling for several changes, including the abolition of Japan’s famous Article 9, which solemnly proclaims “the Japanese people forever renounce war…and the right of belligerency of the state.” With that out, the change would also decree the transformation of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces into a proper Japanese Military Force legally capable of sending troops overseas, and in terms of breaking with the post-war culture, proclaiming the Emperor as the Head of State, not just a symbolic figure.

這次演講對日本右翼來說是一個巨大的打擊,尤其是對現任政府。安倍晉三,日本現任首相,是近半個世紀來日本最有權勢的政治家,他是憲法改革的堅定支持者,堅定支持廢除1948年憲法中最自由的部分,這部分普遍被認為是“美國的強迫”。一份草案已經流傳多年,呼吁進行幾項改革,包括廢除日本著名的憲法第九條,該條鄭重宣布“日本人民永遠放棄戰爭……以及國家交戰的權利”。這樣一來,修改后的憲法將規定日本自衛隊轉變為一支合法的、能夠向海外派兵的日本軍隊,并打破戰后文化,宣布天皇為國家元首,而不僅僅是一個象征性的人物。

The constitutional reform never happened. It doesn’t seem like it ever will. Part of the reason is a complete lack of interest by the majority of the Japanese population. The changes are all rather cosmetic. People’s lives are hard enough in a time of prolonged economic stagnation and higher taxes to pay for the crushing burden of retirees. And part of it is because of the Emperor’s speech stressing that he was a symbol, a good symbol. Reading between the lines, he must have sensed that the government was trying to use his personal charisma to push for a right-wing constitutional reform, and he wouldn’t have it. A Japanese emperor is abdicating for the first time in 200 years, in what could very well be read as a left-wing political statement.

憲法改革從未發生過??蠢從澇兌膊換崍?。部分原因是大多數日本人對此完全不感興趣。這些變化都只是表面現象。在經濟長期停滯和高稅收的時代,人們的生活已經足夠艱難的了。部分原因是因為天皇強調他是一個象征,一個好的象征。從字里行間,他一定意識到政府試圖利用他的個人魅力推動右翼憲法改革,但他不接受。一個日本天皇200年來首次退位,這很可能被解讀為一份左翼政治聲明。

【……略過幾大段作者水字數還沒多少意義的部分……】

The cultural hangups of Japan regarding its vast Chinese cultural heritage is indeed a fascinating topic. Japan has had a love–hate relationship with China from the very beginning, not unlike that of England towards France after the Norman conquest. Politically, Japan always kept his distance from the vast Chinese empire, but the island nation adopted the famously cumbersome Chinese writing system in the 6th century and to date more than half of the Japanese vocabulary is of Chinese origin. Not to mention Japanese dress, architecture, and religion, all of which can directly be traced to China’s Tang Dynasty (618–907). But the love soon became embarrassment after China was defeated by Britain in the 1840 Opium War. Japan embarked on a program of wholesale Westernization in 1868 to avoid sharing the same fate as all the other Asian nations, which were falling under the boot of European empires; the failure of China to modernize and stand up against Western encroachment made a powerful impression on Japan. The embarrassment eventually became utter, sometimes even sadistic, contempt after Japan beat China in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, after which it annexed the island of Taiwan and very nearly got a foothold in the northern Chinese coast. That contempt didn’t disappear after the defeat in World War II, for which the Japanese credit the U.S. military, not Chinese resilience.

日本對其龐大的中國文化傳統的遺存的確是一個令人著迷的話題。日本從一開始就與中國有著愛與恨的關系,就像諾曼征服后英國對法國一樣。在政治上,日本一直與幅員遼闊的中華帝國保持著距離,但這個島國在6世紀采用了以繁冗著稱的中文書寫體系,迄今為止,超過一半的日語詞匯源自中國。更不用說日本的服飾、建筑和宗教,這些都可以直接追溯到中國唐朝(618-907)。但在1840年鴉片戰爭中,中國被英國打敗后,這種愛很快就陷入了尷尬。1868年,日本開始大規模西化,以避免和其他亞洲國家一樣的命運,這些國家正處于歐洲帝國的鐵蹄之下;中國未能實現現代化,也未能抵抗西方的入侵,給日本留下了深刻的印象。在1894年的中日戰爭中,日本擊敗中國,日本吞并了臺灣島,并幾乎在中國北部海岸站穩了腳跟,這一尷尬最終變成了公開的,有時甚至是殘酷的蔑視。這種輕蔑并沒有在二戰失敗后消失,因為日本將失敗歸功于美國軍隊,而不是中國的韌性。

That contempt is only starting to very slowly dissolve after China’s GDP surpassed Japan’s in 2010, to make China the second largest economy in the world. Now, in 2019, China’s GDP is three times as big as Japan’s, and regardless of all the decades of dismissal of Chinese governance and lack of industrial culture, China now dominates many industries Japan used to be very proud of, such as mobile phones. Unthinkable a mere 10 years before, it is now common to see reports in the Japanese press about how China is more innovative than Japan, how it is taking over industry after industry, and that technology jobs in Shanghai, Beijing, or Shenzhen now pay much better than equivalent jobs in Tokyo. Japan is one of the few countries that has managed to have a (small) trade surplus with China, but that may not last long. Add to economic takeover the political tensions between the countries, the conflict around the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu in Chinese), China crowding out Japanese infrastructure exports in the Third World, and Chinese state promotion of World War II “remembrance,” including widely exaggerated history textbooks and historical TV shows portraying the Japanese as evil incarnate, and it’s not hard to imagine just how utterly terrified Japanese statesmen are about the rise of China. Not to mention the 2012 anti-Japanese riots, which saw more than one factory physically burned.

在2010年中國GDP超過日本,成為世界第二大經濟體之后,這種蔑視才開始慢慢消失。現在,在2019年,中國的GDP是日本的三倍,盡管幾十年來日本對中國政府和中國缺乏工業文化不屑一顧,但中國現在主導著許多日本曾經引以為傲的行業,比如手機。如今日本媒體經常報道中國如何比日本更具創新精神,如何接管一個又一個行業,上海、北京或深圳的技術工作現在比東京的同等工作的工資要高得多,這在十年前是不可想象的。日本是為數不多的幾個與中國有貿易順差的國家之一,但這種情況可能不會持續太久。除了經濟接管、兩國之間的政治緊張關系、尖閣列島周圍的沖突(中國稱釣魚島)之外,中國還排擠日本在第三世界的基礎設施出口,以及中國政府推動對二戰的“記憶”,包括被普遍夸大的歷史教科書和歷史電視節目,把日本人描繪成邪惡的化身,不難想象日本政治家對中國的崛起是多么的恐懼。更不用說2012年的反日騷亂,當時不止一家工廠被燒毀。

How has Japan reacted so far to China’s rise? Culturally, a right-wing shift into isolationism and self-congratulation, of which the new “native” regnal name is a good example. Japan is not in decline, they say. We are just doing our own thing. This thing, of course, just happens to include population shrinkage, economic stagnation, a precipitous decline in film and literature quality, and a decline in foreign travel or college students studying abroad. Interestingly, as the Japanese just lose interest in the world outside its islands, foreigners are for the first time ever coming in big numbers. Immigration is slowly but steadily increasing, with the number of foreigners in Japan reaching 2.5 million in 2018. In a rare case of a recent success story, Japan has also rapidly developed its tourism industry. Tens of millions of foreigners (mostly Chinese and Southeast Asian) now flood the country every year (over 30 million in 2018) to enjoy authentic sushi and wear rental kimonos under the spring cherry blossoms. Japan has somewhat overcome its traditional insularity and now relishes its success at attracting tourists. Japanese TV programs show foreigners coming to Japan and enjoying the obviously superior culture, while a panel of Japanese commentators congratulate themselves on how nice it is to see foreigners enjoy the riches of a superior country. Interestingly, the foreigners shown on TV are almost universally white. Whites don’t even make up a quarter of visitors to Japan.

到目前為止,日本對中國的崛起有何反應? 在文化上,右翼轉向孤立主義,并沾沾自喜,其中新的“本土”年號就是一個很好的例子。他們說,日本并沒有衰落,我們只是在做我們自己的事情。當然,這些事情恰好包括人口萎縮、經濟停滯、電影和文學質量急劇下降,以及出國旅游或大學生留學人數的下降。有趣的是,當日本人對島嶼之外的世界失去興趣時,外國人第一次大量涌入。移民正在緩慢但穩步增長,2018年日本外國人達到250萬。日本近年來也迅速發展了旅游業,這是一個罕見的成功案例。每年都有數千萬外國人(主要是中國人和東南亞人)涌入日本(2018年超過3000萬),在春天的?;ㄊ⒖氏磧謎詰氖偎?,穿著租來的和服。日本已經在一定程度上克服了傳統上的閉關自守,現在正享受著吸引游客的成功。在日本的電視節目中,外國人來到日本,享受著明顯優越的文化,而一群日本評論員則為看到外國人享受著一個優越國家的財富而暗自慶幸。有趣的是,電視上的外國人幾乎都是白人。而在日本的游客中,白人甚至還不到四分之一。



Will that be enough? For all the seeming thoughtlessness, Trump had a point when he asked how America benefits from the U.S.-Japan alliance. American economic interests in China are now far larger than those in Japan. While the American military establishment seems firmly set in forming an anti-China front—what I have previously called Cold War II—the Trump administration seems to be getting pushback lately. A recent example is Germany’s and Britain’s decision to not ban Huawei. And most importantly, the American left seems quite amenable to finding an accommodation with China in order to focus on their domestic initiatives. It is not inconceivable that future U.S. governments would throw Japan under the bus in order to reach a deal with China. And Japan must know that.

這就夠了嗎? 盡管特朗普看起來有些輕率,但當他問美國如何從美日聯盟中獲益時,這是有道理的。美國如今在中國的經濟利益遠遠大于在日本的。雖然美國的軍事機構似乎堅定地準備形成一個反華陣線,我以前稱之為冷戰2.0,但特朗普政府最近似乎受到了抵制。最近的一個例子是德國和英國決定不禁止華為。最重要的是,美國左派似乎很樂意與中國達成和解,以便專注于他們的國內舉措。為了與中國達成協議,未來的美國政府會將日本拋棄,這并非不可想象。日本必須明白這一點。

South Korea certainly knows that, and so for years has embarked on a strategy of calculated ambiguity between the U.S. and China. The Korean economy is now much more invested in China than in the U.S. Korea has sent hundreds of thousands of students to both China and the U.S over the years, and its policy on North Korea has been much softer than the U.S. government would have liked. Korea was a Chinese vassal for 1,300 years, with no foreign policy of its own, and used Chinese regnal names (the era names mentioned at the beginning of the article) in official documents. While it’s not throwing itself into China’s hands just yet, it is obviously preparing for an eventuality where it has no choice.

韓國當然知道這一點,因此多年來一直在美國和中國之間采取一種故意模棱兩可的策略。韓國經濟目前在中國的投資遠遠超過美國。多年來,韓國向中國和美國都派出了數十萬名學生,而且韓國對朝鮮的政策比美國政府希望的要溫和得多。朝鮮作為中國的附庸長達1300年,沒有自己的外交政策,在官方文件中使用了中國的年號。雖然它還沒有投入中國的懷抱,但它顯然是在為無可選擇的最終結果做準備。

Japan, on the other hand, seems to be choosing a path of continued independence, burning the bridges, staying put, and asserting its ironclad will not to accept Chinese hegemony. China is also not giving them much of a choice, preferring to use the tried-and-tested boogeyman of World War II Japan as China’s historical enemy for internal propaganda purposes. As so often happens in history, neighboring countries often find it useful to pump up hostility towards each other as a way of pacifying their own domestic populations. Japan has ever-so-subtly hinted that it would militarily support Taiwan in a hypothetical conflict with China. That choice could slightly tip the military balance either way. But, at some point, rhetorical hostility encounters a real crisis. When that happens, countries feel forced to physically react into armed conflict. The results would shape the continent for decades to come.

另一方面,日本似乎在選擇一條繼續獨立的道路,斷交、原地踏步,并堅稱其鐵一般的意志不會接受中國的霸權。中國也沒有給他們太多選擇的余地,更愿意利用二戰時期日本這個久經考驗的惡魔作為中國的歷史敵人,用于內部宣傳。就像歷史上經常發生的那樣,鄰國常常發現,為了安撫本國人民,相互之間挑起敵意是有益的。日本曾非常微妙地暗示,如果臺灣與中國發生沖突,日本將在軍事上支持臺灣。這一選擇可能略微改變軍事平衡。但在,在某些時候,言辭上的敵意會形成一場真正的?;?。當這種情況發生時,各國會被迫對武裝沖突作出實際反應。其結果將在未來幾十年塑造亞洲大陸。